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CIVIL PROCEDURE-Determining When a Party Gives Up
the Right to Disqualify a Judge by Invoking the
Discretion of a Court: JMB Retail Properties Co. v.
Eastburn
"A Snappier Opening"'
The case had started out simple enough. Her client, "Slim" Jim
McDonald, 2 was being sued by the Animals Are People Too Foundation
for psychic injury caused in connection with habitual molestation of
small, woodland creatures.' "No problem," she thought. She specialized
in habitual molestation of small, woodland creatures. 4 She then pushed
the complaint aside, and didn't give it another thought until approximately
29-1/2 days later when her client showed up to discuss the case. When
she asked her assistant for his file, her assistant reminded her that no
answer had been filed yet and she had about half a day left to file one
or have a default judgment entered against McDonald. "Damn. I'll have
to file a motion to extend," she said. "Who's hearing the case?" "Steelbottom, your favorite," came the answer.
Her heart nearly stopped beating. Steelbottom! God how she hated
that man! Time and time again he had humiliated her in courtrooms,
asking outrageous questions that he knew she couldn't possible answer
just for the sake of watching her squirm in front of a jury. He'd never
give her an extension, because he never gave anyone any breaks. Well
she'd had enough of his antics, and she wasn't going to give him the
chance to embarrass her again. She knew that under New Mexico law,
she had the right to excuse Steelbottom for whatever reason she wantedno questions asked.' She'd boot him off the case faster than he could
say [some weird Latin legal phrase]. "Call his office," she said to her
assistant, "and tell him I'm coming over to ask him for an extension
in person."
As she walked with her client over to Steelbottom's office to present
the challenge in person, she laughed to herself. He would think that she
was coming over to beg him for more time, but the joke would be on
him. She had the power! She saw him as she entered his clerk's office;
his eyes got that merry little twinkle that they always did when he thought
1. Because the Survey Editor kept bugging me to come up with one.
2. His real name is "Slim" Jim MacDonald, but it has been changed for this article to protect
his anonymity.
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 182-768-347(A)(l)(a)(xxxviii) (Cum. Supp. 1994). Under this statute,
"small woodland creatures" includes, but are not limited to bunnies, badgers, chipmunks, wolf
puppies, squirrels, and other such furry fauna. Foundation members claim they can hear the cries
of the animals for help and. it is driving them crazy, because "inside every animal is a human
being trying to get out."
4. Meaning, in that type of defense work, of course.
5. This is called a "peremptory challenge." See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
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he would be able to put her through the wringer. "Come in, counselor,
come in," he said. She saw that grin start to spread across his face and
it steeled her resolve to get rid of him even more.
When she and her client were directly in front of him, however, she
suffered a violent sneezing attack. Viscous mucous splattered all over
her, her brief case, and her client. The judge burst out laughing while
she tried to remove the foreign matter from her client's face. "Would
you at least give me your damned handkerchief to clean him up with?!"
she hissed at him. The judge stopped for a second and thought about
it intently. "YES!" he said in a voice loud enough for all to hear, and
he handed her a tattered old piece of cloth.
"Thank you," she said, her voice dripping with venom, "and for your
information, you're off this case, because my client is exercising his
peremptory challenge, so HA HA!"
"Oh I don't think so, counselor," he managed to choke out between
laughs. "By asking for the use of my handkerchief, you posed a question
to me on which I could answer 'yes' or 'no'; thus, you have invoked
my discretion on a matter involving your client, and your peremptory
challenge is properly denied. You obviously haven't read JMB Retail
Properties Co. v. Eastburn; otherwise, you would know better. Now,
about that extension, I really think you've had plenty of time already ......
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under current New Mexico law, each party to an action has the right
to excuse one judge from hearing that action through the use of a
peremptory challenge. 6 A peremptory challenge does not need to be
supported by any particular justification for the disqualification that party
might have. It is a fairly recent addition as a mechanism of judicial
disqualification, replacing the earlier system which required a party to
file an affidavit stating the reasons for the disqualification of a judge.

6. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1987) provides in part:
A party to an action or proceeding, civil or criminal . .. shall have the right to
exercise a peremptory challenge to the district judge before whom the action or
proceeding is to be tried and heard ....
After the exercise of a peremptory challenge,
that district judge shall proceed no further ....
Each party . . . may excuse only
one district judge.
N.M. R. Civ. P. § 1-088.1 provides in part:
B. Procedure for excusing a district judge. The statutory right to excuse the district
court judge before whom the case is pending must be exercised:
(1) by each party plaintiff by filing a peremptory election to excuse with the
clerk of the district court within ten (10) days after the latter of:
(a) the filing of the complaint; or
(b) mailing by the clerk of notice of assignment or reassignment of the case to
a judge; and
(2) by the defendant or any other party by filing a peremptory election to excuse
within ten (10) days after the latter of the filing of the first pleading or motion
pursuant to Rule 1-012 by that party or of mailing by the clerk of notice of
assignment or reassignment of the case to a judge.
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Both methods raise a common question, however, which the New Mexico
Supreme Court was recently asked to answer: at what point in a proceeding
is it too late for a party to disqualify a judge? The court held in JMB
Retail Properties Company v. Eastburn7 that a party may not disqualify
a judge if that party has submitted any matter, whether contested or
not, to the court for determination. In doing so, the court scrutinized
procedural law promulgated both by itself and by the New Mexico State
Legislature dealing with the disqualification of judges by peremptory
challenge. Before JMB Retail, a party could not disqualify a judge after
the party had submitted a litigated or contested matter to the court for
determination, having thus "invoked" that court's discretion. 8 This Note
examines the evolution of the standard used to decide when a party
invokes a court's discretion, and the ramifications of the JMB Retail
decision upon that standard.
This Note also briefly examines several constitutional arguments presented in JMB Retail which the court declined to answer. These arguments
deal mainly with the question of where the power to promulgate rules
regarding disqualification of judges resides under the provisions of the
New Mexico Constitution.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

JMB Retail Properties Company (JMB) owned a private shopping mall
at which it refused to allow a political party to conduct various political
activities. 9 The political party sued JMB, seeking a court injunction to
prohibit the owners of the mall from forbidding the party's activities at
the mall. The case was assigned to Judge Benjamin S. Eastburn in San
Juan County District Court.' 0
On April 6, 1992, JMB entered its appearance." On April 8 and again
on April 13, JMB's counsel filed motions to extend its time to answer
the complaint or plead otherwise. Opposing counsel agreed to both
motions, and on April 17, Judge Eastburn granted the second motion.
Ten days later, on April 27, JMB filed a peremptory challenge to disqualify
Judge Eastburn, along with a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a

7. 114 N.M. 115, 835 P.2d 831 (1992).
8. Id. at 118, 835 P.2d at 834 (citing Smith v. Martinez, 96 N.M. 440, 442, 631 P.2d 1308,
1310 (1981)).
9. Brief of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and the New Mexico Defense Lawyers
Association, Amici Curiae at 1, JMB Retail Properties Company v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 835
P.2d 831 (1992) (No. 20,594). On the merits, the arguments forwarded in this case raised the
question of whether the free speech provisions of a state constitution give broader protection than
does the 1st Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See generally Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) for a discussion of this question.
10. Brief of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and the New Mexico Defense Lawyers
Association, Amici Curiae at 1, JMB Retail Properties Company v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 835
P.2d 831 (1992) (No. 20,594).
11. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 117, 835 P.2d at 833. This cite applies to all of the facts set
forth in this paragraph.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24

claim. On April 28, the court clerk gave the parties notice of no action
2
on JMB's peremptory challenge.'
Judge Eastburn declined to give JMB's peremptory challenge effect. 3
He cited two reasons for his decision: (1) JMB failed to file the peremptory
challenge in a timely manner; and (2) even if the challenge had been
timely, it was ineffective because both the statute and the rule authorizing
peremptory -challenges to judges were unconstitutional. JMB petitioned
the supreme court for a writ of superintending control, prohibition, or
mandamus to require Judge Eastburn to recognize its peremptory challenge.
At oral argument, the supreme court ruled from the bench that JMB
had invoked the discretion of the trial court by requesting an extension
of time within which to answer or plead otherwise.' 4 Because of this
invocation, JMB was prohibited from exercising its peremptory challenge,
and the supreme court denied JMB's petition. 5
III. EFFECT OF PRIOR JUDICIAL ACTIONS ON THE RIGHT
TO DISQUALIFY A JUDGE-A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIMING
"New Mexico law is well settled that a judge may not be statutorily
disqualified . . . after a party has invoked the discretion of the court.' 6
What is not well settled, however, is what actions form an invocation
of a court's discretion. Adding to the confusion is the fact that the
statute governing such disqualifications has undergone several changes
over the years since its inception.
To examine properly made disqualifications more closely, two changes
in particular should be noted. First, the early version of the disqualification
statute required a party to file an affidavit stating that the judge scheduled
to hear a case could not do so with impartiality.' 7 In 1985, however,
the statute was amended, replacing the affidavit requirement by providing
for a peremptory challenge which does not require an affidavit.' 8 This
change effectively streamlined the disqualification system by removing
the chance for a judge to challenge an affidavit, which would possibly
require a hearing on the matter, thus causing delay on hearing the merits
of a case.
Second, the timing within which the disqualification must be made has
changed. The 1933 statute provided that an affidavit of disqualification
had to be filed "not less than ten (10) days before the beginning of the

12. Because JMB filed its peremptory challenge more than ten days after filing its first motion
to extend, according to the court clerk, the statutory time period within which a party must file
a peremptory challenge had expired. Id.
13. Id. at 116, 835 P.2d at 832. This cite applies to all of the facts set forth in this paragraph.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Smith v. Martinez, 96 N.M. 440, 442, 631 P.2d 1308, 1310 (1981) (citing N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-3-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1987)).
17. 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 184, § 1.
18. 1985 N.M. Laws ch. 91.
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term of Court, if said case is at issue."' 19 The statute was amended in
1971 to read that an affidavit had to be filed "within ten days after
the cause is at issue or within ten days after the time for filing a demand
for jury trial has expired, whichever is later." ' 20 A 1977 amendment
provided that an affidavit must be filed "within ten days after the cause
is at issue or within ten days after the time for filing a demand for jury
trial has expired, or within 10 days after the judge sought to be disqualified
is assigned to the case, whichever is the later." ' 2' Again, the statute and
subsequent amendments shed little on the question of what the legislature
intended by the phrase "at issue." Courts have focused on this question,
however, in deciding at what point a judicial disqualification will or will
not be honored.
A. Disqualification Before Adverse Judicial Determination of a
Contested Matter: The "Testing the Waters" Standard
An early judicial attempt at establishing a criterion to decide when a
matter was "at issue" resulted in the "testing the waters" standard,
forbidding a party from disqualifying a judge after the judge had made
an adverse ruling on a contested matter. This standard was first articulated
in State ex rel. Shufeldt v. Armijo,22 in which the judge opposed his
disqualification by affidavit because "certain important issues had been,
prior thereto, submitted to and decided by the judge either upon stipulation
or without the objection of" the party seeking disqualification. 2a The
Shufeldt court looked at how far the case had already progressed: first,
the plaintiff had filed a complaint asking for an injunction, order,
temporary injunction, and order to show cause; second, the judge had
entered an order regarding the stipulation of the parties to continue the
hearing subject to setting a hearing date upon notice served on the
opposing party; and finally, the judge then entered another order con24
tinuing the hearing agreed upon by all parties.
The Shufeldt court declared that disqualification must be "filed and
called to the attention of the court before it made any ruling on any
litigated matter or contested matter .... "25 This principle was necessary,
according to the court, because the court "cannot permit a litigant to
test the mind of the trial judge like a boy testing the temperature of
the water in the pool with his toe, and if found to his liking, decides
'26
to take a plunge."
Because the motions filed before the disqualification were agreed upon
by both parties, the Shufeldt court decided that "[a]t no time was the

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

1933 N.M. Laws ch. 184 § 2 (emphasis added).
1971 N.M. Laws ch. 123 (emphasis added).
1977 N.M. Laws ch. 228, § 2 (emphasis added).
39 N.M. 502, 50 P.2d 852 (1935).
Id. at 503, 50 P.2d at 853.
Id. at 504, 50 P.2d at 854.
Id. at 505, 50 P.2d at 855.
Id.
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[lower] court called upon to judicially determine any contested matter
in the case ... . "27 Thus, the court upheld the disqualification because8
there had not been a testing of the judicial waters for adverse rulings.
B.

"Testing the Waters," Favorable Rulings, and Judicial Economy
The Shufeldt standard was reaffirmed by the supreme court in State
ex rel. Gandert et al. v. Armijo,2 9 although in Gandert, the judge ruled
favorably on a matter raised by the parties seeking the judge's subsequent
disqualification. Those parties had petitioned the district court for a
recount of votes cast in a general election in Mora County. Finding the
petition legally sufficient, the judge signed and entered an order setting
a date for a recount, over which he was to preside. 0 The petitioners
then sought to disqualify the judge on the belief that he could not preside
over the recount impartially.
The Gandert court decided that the act of testing the sufficiency of
the petition, thus determining whether the petitioners had a legal right
to a recount, was a judicial determination of the most important issue
in the case.' The only act that remained to be done was to actually
recount the votes. Applying the Shufeldt standard, the Gandert court
held that because the only important issue in the case had been submitted
for judicial determination, the petitioners
could not disqualify the judge
2
from presiding over the recount.1
C. Invoking Discretion and Statutorily Mandated Judicial Actions
The Shufeldt standard was later applied where a judge performed a
duty for a party in a proceeding required by law, and the party then
attempted to disqualify the judge. In Smith v. Martinez," the judge
selected and appointed an attorney for a minor in a Children's Court
proceeding, and claimed that by doing so, his actions invoked the discretion of the court and thus he could not be disqualified.3 4 The judge
did not, however, perform this action at the request of the State or its
representative; he did so pursuant to a statutorily imposed duty. In
proceedings of the nature involved in this case, New Mexico law mandated
that a judge appoint counsel for the child when the right to counsel for
the child is not waived." "The fact that the [judge] may have authority
to determine who the appointed counsel will be is not the exercising of

27. Id. at 508, 50 P.2d at 856.
28. Id.
29. 41 N.M. 38, 63 P.2d 1037 (1936).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 39, 63 P.2d at 1037-38.
32. Id.
33. 96 N.M. 440, 631 P.2d 1308 (1981).
34. Id. at 442, 631 P.2d at 1310.
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-1-16, 32A-2-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1993) (at the time this case arose,
the statute was numbered 32-1-27(E)).
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a discretionary act at the request of the State. ' 36 Therefore, the reviewing
7
court held the disqualification of the judge proper.
D. Clarifying the "At Issue" Issue
A recent refinement of the Shufeldt standard came in Pueblo of Laguna
v. Cillessen & Sons,38 which, like Shufeldt and Gandert, involved the
issue of timely filing of an affidavit of disqualification. The plaintiff in
Cillessen filed a petition to consolidate two arbitration proceedings, but
39
the petition had to be amended twice in order to correct serious defects.
The applicable statute provided that an affidavit of disqualification could
4
not be filed more than ten days after the case is at issue. The Cillessen
court ruled that "[a] case is deemed 'at issue' when an answer is filed4
'
[by a defendant] which requires no further pleadings by plaintiff."
Because the plaintiff did not have a sufficient petition until it was amended
a second time, the case was not "at issue" until that second amended
petition was filed. 42 Furthermore, until the plaintiff's petition in Cillessen
was sufficient to enjoin all the necessary parties to arbitration, the court
its discretion over the consolidation of
was not in a position to exercise
43
the arbitration proceedings.
The Cillessen court's interpretation of the statutory language moved
the time to file a peremptory challenge ahead of that required under
Shufeldt. Cillessen required filing an affidavit of disqualification before
a case is "at issue," rather than the Shufeldt requirement of filing before
a court makes a ruling on any "litigated" or "contested" matter. Nevertheless, the main intention of the Shufeldt standard remained. The right
of disqualification had to be exercised before a court exercised discretion
on a matter disputed by the parties.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

The JMB Retail court discarded the Shufeldt standard along with its
refinements and adopted what it termed a "bright-line" standard, "under
which the determinative issue is whether the party has invoked the discretion of the court. If so, that party may not excuse the judge."" This
new standard might be more appropriately called a "use-it-or-lose-it"
standard, as any time a pleading or motion is made on which a judge
can answer "yes" or "no" before a peremptory challenge is filed, the

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
1971))
42.
43.
44.

Smith, 96 N.M. at 442, 631 P.2d at 1310.
Id.
101 N.M. 341, 682 P.2d 197 (1984).
Id. at 342, 682 P.2d at 198.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-10 (1978).
Id. at 342, 682 P.2d at 198 (citing Atol v. Schifani, 83 N.M. 316, 491 P.2d 533 (Ct. App.
(emphasis added).
Cillessen, 101 N.M. at 342, 682 P.2d at 198.
Id.
JMB Retail Properties Company v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 118, 835 P.2d 831, 834 (1992).
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filing party loses its right to a peremptory challenge. Whether a court
actually rules on that matter is immaterial: "The rule . . . depends ...
not upon whether the court in fact exercised discretion, but depends upon
whether the response of the court was subject to discretion. ' 45
The key to the Shufeldt standard was that the challenge be used before
a court made a ruling on any litigated matter or contested matter in a
case." "Litigate" is defined as "the act of carrying on a lawsuit in a
court of law . . . hence, any controversy that must be decided upon
evidence in a court of law." ' 47 In JMB Retail, no matter had been raised
that needed resolving by evidentiary weighing at the point of the attempted
disqualification, nor had any matter been contested by the parties at that
point. JMB had not filed an answer to the request for an injunction,
so there was no dispute of the facts in the case to that point. Therefore,
under the Shufeldt standard, it would seem that JMB's peremptory
challenge would have been valid at the time it was made.
The JMB Retail court's new "bright-line" standard, however, yields
a very different result due to a lack of qualification of the type of
motion or pleading filed as opposed to the Shufeldt test. Shufeldt required
disqualification of a judge before any "litigated" or "contested" matter
arose; JMB Retail simply requires that any motion or pleading be filed.
Unless performing an act mandated by statute," almost anything a court
does is an exercise of discretion, despite whether a submitted motion or
pleading concerns the most important matter in a case or the most minor
matter imaginable. The result is the same, however: the submitting party
has given up its right to a peremptory challenge.
The court in JMB Retail apparently sought to alleviate any uncertainty
on the issue of when a party invokes the discretion of the court: "We
are loath to engage in speculation on whether a ruling is 'important' or
'adverse' or the like. In many cases such characterizations often lie in
the eye of the beholder .... The dispositive issue ... is whether [a]
motion filed invoked the discretion of the judge." ' 49
In JMB Retail, opposing counsel agreed to both of the motions made
by defendant JMB to extend the time to file an answer. Thus, at that
point, there was no dispute or issue to be resolved by the court, as JMB
had yet to have filed an answer to the arguments presented against it
by the plaintiff. However, the dispositive factor was that JMB had filed
its motions upon which the judge had the opportunity to rule. Therefore,
under JMB Retail, a peremptory challenge should be the very first order
of business an attorney tends to before making any other motion or

45. Id.
46. State ex rel. Shufeldt v. Armijo, 39 N.M. 502, 506, 50 P.2d 852, 855 (1935).
47. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (6th ed. 1990).

48. See Smith v. Martinez, 96 N.M. 440, 442, 631 P.2d 1308, 1310 (1981) (party on whose
behalf Judge performs action mandated by law is not invoking the discretion of the court and thus
precluded from exercising peremptory challenge).
49. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 118, 835 P.2d at 834.
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pleading in a suit or it is very likely that the right to excuse a judge
will be lost.50
CONSTITUTIONAL DISPUTES OVER PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
The lower court judge in JMB Retail not only denied effect to JMB's
peremptory challenge, he declared both the statute and civil procedure
rule dealing with peremptory challenges unconstitutional. 5 ' However, the
supreme court declined to rule on the constitutional questions because
its ruling on the dispositive issue of the validity of JMB's peremptory
52
challenge upheld Judge Eastburn's refusal to honor that challenge.
The court did, however, take the opportunity to express some arguments
presented by the parties. The dispute centered mainly around where the
origin of the power to regulate the disqualification of judges resides: in
the legislature, in the judiciary, in both, or perhaps in neither. The main
points of these arguments are briefly presented in this Note because while
the court declined to rule under this particular set of facts, the arguments
do raise some interesting questions that might require an answer under
different circumstances.
V.

Judge Eastburn's Arguments
Judge Eastburn first focused on what he perceived to be the interference
of the peremptory challenge statute with the power of the district courts
to regulate the distribution of cases that come under their jurisdictions.
Declaring the statute unconstitutional, Judge Eastburn stated, "[T]here
is nothing more necessary and incidental to the functions of the District
Court of New Mexico than the internal assignment of cases to its judges." 5 3
He also asserted that judges are "Constitutional officers selected by a
process ordained by the people of New Mexico." '5 4 Judge Eastburn viewed
the power to assign judges to be an essential element of judicial power,
and thus, an attempt by the legislature to regulate in this core judicial
area clearly violates the separation of powers clause of the New Mexico
Constitution."

A.

50. But see Saavedra v. Thompson, 114 N.M. 718, 845 P.2d 812 (1992) (litigant's agreement
not to oppose an opponent's motion for an extension of time in which to file a brief is not a
request for discretionary ruling, such as would preclude a litigant from later using it's peremptory
challenge against a judge).
51. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 116, 835 P.2d at 832 (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-3-9 and N.M.
R. Cwv. P. § 1-088.1). See supra note. 6 for the relevant text of these provisions.
52. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 117, 835 P.2d at 833 ("We follow the general and well-established
rule that issues of constitutionality are not to be determined unless absolutely necessary to the merits
of the suit in which constitutionality has been drawn in question.").
53. Id. at 116, 835 P.2d at 832.
54. Id.
section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution provides:
55. Id. Article III,
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments,
the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall
exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
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Nor could Judge Eastburn find a specific grant of authority to the
supreme court to promulgate a peremptory challenge rule . 6 Under the
election and retention process in New Mexico, judges must "run against
their record[s], i.e., their continuance in public employment is dependent
on the manner in which they execute their office." ' 57 Judge Eastburn
maintained that the peremptory challenge rule is "antithetical to Judicial
Reform . . . .It allows lawyers and special-interest litigants to ... thwart
the public will by insulating the judge's performance, or lack thereof,
from the people in the retention process." 8 This argument seems to be
that only the voters should have the power to bar a judge from fulfilling
his or her duty. Therefore, regardless of any alleged inability of that
judge to rule upon a matter in an impartial or unbiased manner perceived
by a single or even several parties, the voting majority has spoken, and
its will should be carried out.
B.

JMB and Amici's Answer
JMB and Amici responded with four arguments which dealt directly
with the constitutional challenges raised by Judge Eastburn1 9 The first
point is that New Mexico law recognizes a "coordinate" rule-making
power shared by the legislature and the judiciary, especially where procedural matters are concerned. 60 JMB argued that "statutes affecting the
exclusive power of the judiciary are unconstitutional only to the extent
they conflict with a valid rule of the court." 6'
The New Mexico Supreme Court has also indicated that this "shared"
rule-making power particularly applies where the legislature passes an act
for the "convenience" of the courts. In Lovelace Medical Center v.
Mendez, 62 the New Mexico Legislature had passed a law providing that
an application for an interlocutory appeal not acted upon by the court
63
of appeals within twenty days of its filing would be deemed denied.
The Mendez court decided that the legislature merely intended to provide

56. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 116, 835 P.2d at 832. But see N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 3 ("The
supreme court ... shall have a superintending control over all inferior courts ... .
57. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 116, 835 P.2d at 832.
58. Id. at 117, 835 P.2d at 833.
59. JMB also raised the argument that regardless of whether its motion invoked the discretion
of the court, it had never waived its right to exercise a peremptory challenge within the statutory
time period. Id. at 118, 835 P.2d at 834. The JMB Retail court was not receptive to the argument,
stating, "[A]n absolute application of the rule [forbidding disqualification of judges after a party
has invoked the discretion of the court) is .. .of greater import than . . .intentional waiver ......
Id.
60. See generally Michael B. Browde & M.E. Occhialino, Separation of Powers and the Judicial
Rule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for Prudential Constraints, 15 N.M. L. REv. 407
(1985).

61. JMB Retail, 114 N.M. at 116, 835 P.2d at 833. See also Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M.
717, 718, 507 P.2d 778, 779 (1973) ("This court has no quarrel with ... statutory arrangements
which seem reasonable and workable and has not seen fit to change it by rule."); Ammerman v.
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 551 P.2d 1354 (1976); State ex rel. McBride, 88 N.M.
244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
62. 111 N.M. 336, 805 P.2d 603 (1991).

63. Id. at 338, 805 P.2d at 605.
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the judiciary system with a "mechanism" by which district courts could
be certain when to resume a case in which an interlocutory appeal had
been made, thus speeding up the entire process. 64 In such circumstances,
the Mendez court held that the supreme court will uphold statutes that
regulate judicial
procedure "unless and until . . . modified by a rule of
' 65
this court."
Second, Amici noted that the peremptory challenge by statute and rule
has a substantial historical basis in New Mexico." The issue of the
propriety of peremptory challenges under statute and rule had itself been
ruled upon favorably in a criminal law setting in State ex rel. Gesswein
v. Galvan.67 In Gesswein, the State filed a peremptory challenge under
a rule promulgated by the legislature." The rule did away with the need
to file an affidavit of bias or prejudice to disqualify a judge from hearing
a criminal case, as does the current civil rule. The judge declined to
recognize the validity of the rule or the State's peremptory challenge,
and the State filed for a writ of prohibition. 69
The Gesswein court held the legislative rule to be valid until it conflicted
with a rule promulgated by the supreme court. 70 The Gesswein court
noted that the peremptory challenge is based in the federal and state
constitutionally guaranteed right to a fair and impartial tribunal. 7 ' The
right to disqualify judges for issues of impartiality existed before the
legislature passed laws defining how to go about such disqualifications.7 2
Thus, a statute that merely gave procedural power to a right already in
7
existence is "a prerogative of [the supreme] court."
Third, in order to counter Judge Eastburn's arguments about the validity
of Rule 1-088.1, JMB contended that Judge Eastburn was confused over
"the concept of qualification for judicial office . . . with that of selection
of the presiding judge for an individual case." ' 74 In support, Amici cited
State ex rel. Oliver v. Crookham which held that legislation regarding
removal from judicial office and election of judges .'deal[s] with matters
64. Id.
65. Id. at 339, 805 P.2d at 606. The Mendez court based its holding in part on American Farm
Lines v. Black Ball Freight Services, 397 U.S. 532 (1970), which "noted the general principle that
it is always within the discretion of a court ... to relax or modify its procedural rules adopted
for the orderly transaction of business when . . . [the] ends of justice require it." (quoting NLRB
v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953)).
66. Brief of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and the New Mexico Defense Lawyers
Association, Amici Curiae at 5, JMB Retail Properties Co. v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 835 P.2d
at 831 (1992) (No. 20,594).
67. 100 N.M. 769, 676 P.2d 1334 (1984).
68. Id. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335; see N.M. R. Cram. P. 34.1.
69. Id. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335.
70. Id. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337.
71. Id. at 770, 676 P.2d at 1335 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V & amend. XIV; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 14 (Cum. Supp. 1983), art. II, § 18, & art. VI, § 18).
72. Id. at 771, 676 P.2d at 1336.
73. Id. at 772, 676 P.2d at 1337. The Gesswein court went on to invalidate the rule: "[T]he
increasing number of disqualifications indicates that the current procedure as found in Rule 34.1
is inappropriate and is hereby retracted. This Court will promulgate proper rules governing disqualification." Id.
74. JMB Retail Properties Co. v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 117, 835 P.2d 831, 833 (1992).
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different from those' governed by disqualification statutes, and the former
in no way supersedes or impliedly repeals the latter." 5
Finally, Amici asserted that Rule 1-088.1 should be retained because
of the important values it serves. Referring to the joint procedural rulemaking system of the legislature and the judiciary, Amici wrote that the
current system of simply filing a peremptory challenge with the court
and thereby excusing a judge "helps speed the [justice system] process
by eliminating the need for litigation over the difficult and sensitive
questions that surround the issue of fairness. ' 76 Further, the current
system "saves judges the embarrassment and difficulty that [would] necjudgment of one's own possible
essarily surround litigation concerning
77
bias or prejudice in a given case.'
Thus, according to Amici, the present statute/rule system not only
prevents increased litigation that would "unnecessarily consume valuable
judicial time," the system also prevents the "inexorably undermin[ing]"
effect that such litigation would have on the "public confidence in the
integrity of our judicial institutions.' '78
C. Some Potential Questions Regarding Peremptory Challenges
Because the constitutional arguments presented in JMB Retail went
unanswered, interesting questions about the propriety of peremptory challenges remain. 79 The original disqualification statute required that a party
file an affidavit stating that a judge could not rule impartially or was
biased in some way on a matter.80 Because the affidavit could be challenged, it had to be justified: actual bias or prejudice, not some theoretical
or remote interest, was required in order for a disqualification to be
constitutionally valid."
On the other hand, the peremptory challenge requires no such justification. 82 Under this system, a judge can be disqualified for any number
of reasons, not one of which must be a valid consideration of a judge's
ability to fairly and impartially carry out his or her duties. For example,

75. Brief of the New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association and the New Mexico Defense Lawyers
Association, Amici Curiae at 4, JMB Retail Property Co. v. Eastburn, 114 N.M. 115, 835 P.2d
831 (1992) (No. 20,594) (citing State ex rel. Oliver v. Crookham, 731 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Or. 1987)).
76. Id. at 7.
77. Id. at 8.
78. Id.

79. Much more detailed arguments regarding these and other hypothetical questions were raised
in the briefs of parties in El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Eastburn, No. 20,685 (N.M. 1992). This
case involved a peremptory challenge to the same judge as in JMB Retail and substantially the
same procedural and constitutional issues, and was filed shortly after JMB Retail was. In an
unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court again did not answer the constitutional issues.
80. 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 184, § 1.
81. State ex rel. Gesswein v. Galvan, 100 N.M. 769, 770, 676 P.2d 1334, 1335 (1984) (citing
Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 410 P.2d 732 (1966)).
82. See supra note 6 for the relevant parts of the legislative rule and the judiciary rule.
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peremptory challenges could be based solely on race or sex, with the
challenging party required to give no explanation therefore.
Institutional, "blanket" disqualification could be another improper use
of the peremptory challenge. For example, assume a district attorney's
or a public defender's office is displeased with the way a judge rules
on certain matters, even though those rulings are arguably correct as a
matter of law. Regardless, the attorney files a standing peremptory challenge, effective any time a case is assigned to that judge. By such action,
the attorney could effectively frustrate the will of the majority of voters
in that district by preventing their elected official from carrying out the
duties of his or her office.
The effects of blanket disqualifications would be especially pronounced
in smaller judicial districts. Imagine a district with only two judges, Judge
A and Judge B. The lawyers practicing in the district decide that they
do not like Judge A, and for the most part, they all file standing
peremptory challenges against Judge A. This blanket challenge would
cause the same frustration of voter will as would occur as in the scenario
above. Worse yet, Judge B now has a substantially larger caseload than
Judge A, and the district is plunged into judicial gridlock, one of the
very problems the peremptory challenge system was intended to combat.83
These are but a few examples of the problems that use of the peremptory
challenge as a method of disqualification can raise. One can imagine
many such situations, but the power to prevent these occurrences ultimately
rests in the rule-making power of the supreme court.
V.

CONCLUSION

A.

Effect of Judicial Discretionary Act on Peremptory Challenges
The JMB Retail decision changed the standard used to determine when
a party invokes the discretion of a court, after which a party may not

83. Consider the following disqualification patterns under the affidavit system from a few smaller
New Mexico judicial districts from July 1981 through June 1982 (the last year such statistics were
reported in the New Mexico Judicial Department annual reports), comparing the number of individual
disqualifications for each judge in that particular district against the total number of cases decided
in that district:
DISTRICT

JUDGES

NUMBER OF
DISQUALIFICATIONS

NUMBER OF CASES
DECIDED

4

Angel
Martinez

16
237

1152

6

Hodges
Hughes

8
179

1627

9

Nieves
Hensley

3
42

2372

11

Musgrave
DePauli
Brown

13
2
154

3735

(SOURCE: 1981-1982 NEW MEXICO JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT 27, 30-3 1.)
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use its peremptory challenge to excuse a judge pursuant to section 38-39 of the New Mexico Statutes and the New Mexico Rule of Civil Procedure
1-088.1. Under JMB Retail's "bright-line" standard, any time a party
submits any pleading or motion upon which a judge may rule, notwithstanding the degree of importance of that pleading or motion, that party
invokes the discretion of the court at that time. Regardless of whether
the judge actually rules upon the motion or pleading, the party loses its
right to disqualify the judge in that action.
Constitutional Issues Not Reached
The parties in JMB Retail also raised several arguments regarding
peremptory challenges, mainly dealing with where the authority to promulgate such procedural rules is found under the New Mexico Constitution:
in the legislature or in the judiciary. The court, however, declined to
rule on those arguments.
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